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Abstract—The moral status of genetic material and information, and the ethics o f controlling and  
manipulating them, is a topic of hot debate in many European countries, including The Netherlands. 
That heat is due partly to the complexity of the topic, and partly to researchers* fear that their investi­
gations will be hampered by restrictions on the use of personal data or body material. But there is little 
doubt that manifold diverging interpretations about the status of the human body, body materials, and  
personal information in Dutch law, written and unwritten, contribute to the intensity of the debates. 
This article intends to structure the debate by creating more clarity at the conceptual level. By carefully 
examining relevant articles of the Constitution and Civil Codes, as well as policy documents and 
authoritative publications, notably in reference to prominent legal concepts such as property, ownership 
and privacy, an answer should be provided to the following crucial question: is the status o f genetic 
material and information in any sense special in comparison with other body parts and other kinds o f  
information about a person? This paper first discusses the status of human body materials and personal 
information in general, and then continues with a more specific discussion about the status o f genetic 
material and information. It concludes that the Dutch legislature had carefully avoided (or not felt the 
need to employ) the concept of ownership in regulating biomedical research; rather, privacy is found to 
be the prime regulatory concept. ©  1997 Elsevier Science Ltd
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INTRODUCTION
The moral status of genetic material and infor­
mation, and the ethics of controlling and manipu­
lating them, is a topic of hot debate in many 
European countries, including The Netherlands. 
That heat is due partly to the complexity of the 
topic, and partly to researchers’ fear that their in­
vestigations will be hampered by the restrictions on 
the uses of personal data and body material. But 
there is little doubt that manifold diverging in­
terpretations about the status of the human body, 
body materials, and personal information in Dutch 
law, written and unwritten, contribute to the inten­
sity of the debates.
This article structures the debate by clarifying 
the conceptual level. By carefully examining rel­
evant articles of the Constitution and Civil 
Codes, as well as policy documents and authori­
tative publications, notably in reference to pro­
minent legal concepts such as property, 
ownership and privacy, an answer should be 
provided to the following crucial question: is the 
status of genetic material and information in 
any sense special in comparison with other body 
parts and other kinds of information about a 
person?
* Author for correspondence,
First, we will discuss the status of human body 
materials and personal information more in general. 
Then, we will continue with a more specific discus­
sion about the status of genetic material and infor­
mation. It will be concluded that the Dutch 
legislature has carefully avoided (or not felt the 
need to employ) the concept of ownership in regu­
lating biomedical research; rather, privacy will be 
found to be the prime regulatory concept.
THE STATUS OF THE HUMAN BODY AND BODY
MATERIAL
According to various health lawyers, a living 
human being is a unity of mind and body. The per­
son that figures in Dutch law as the subject of 
rights is this unity of mind and body (and not some 
bodiless creature). In The Netherlands, the body of 
the living human being has never been considered 
an object with respect to which ownership is poss­
ible. It falls outside the scope of property law 
(Leenen, 1978; Gevers, 1990),
If the living human body as a whole is not owned 
by the person, what about body materials (fluids, 
cells, tissues) that are separated from the body? In 
Dutch legal doctrine there is no consensus with 
regard to the status of body material. Some lawyers 
argue that body material falls within the bounds of 
property law, When separated from the body, the
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body material changes its character from an inte­
gral part of the body to an object that is suscep­
tible to human control. Due to the separation, 
body material turns into an item that can be 
owned, and the person from whom the material is 
taken becomes the owner (Leenen, 1978; Gevers, 
1989, 1990). Ownership of one’s body material 
does not imply that a person is completely free to 
decide what to do with his “property” . For 
example, the sale of organs is commonly con­
sidered immoral and only donation is legally per­
mitted. Financial gain for blood donations is 
explicitly prohibited by law.
Because difficulties arise when body material is 
dealt with in terms of ownership (owners do not 
have all the rights defined in the Civil Code as 
property rights), some authors avoid the concept of 
“ownership” when discussing body material and de­
rive the right to control body material from consti­
tutional rights to privacy and to integrity of the 
body (Frankena and de Graaf, 1990),
This “move” away from the concept of owner­
ship is supported by the Dutch Constitution, for in 
neither of the two relevant constitutional articles is 
there mention of such a concept:
Article 10, Dutch Constitution:
(1) Everybody has, barring or under restrictions 
to be set by law, a right to respect for his 
personal domain of life.
(2) The law will set rules for the protection of 
the personal domain of life with regard to 
the registration and provision of personal 
data.
(3) The law will set rules concerning the claims 
(titles) of persons to inspection of the regis­
tered data concerning their person, and the 
use that is made thereof, as well as to the 
correction of such data.
Article 11, Dutch Constitution:
Everybody has, barring or under restrictions to
be set by law, a right to the inviolability of his
body.
Article 10 underscores that information (personal 
data) falls under the concept of the “personal 
domain of life” or “privacy”. In spite of the linguis­
tic suggestion that the body is an entity worthy of 
respect, regardless the private intentions of the per­
son embodying it, Article 11 is meant to emphasize 
that the human body is part of the personal domain 
of life and deserves the same kind of protection as 
is warranted under Article 10.
Since identifiable body material contains personal 
information, it falls under the protection of Article
10. It is unclear, however, whether a person has 
control over the use of his anonymous body ma­
terial. Some lawyers argue that Article 11 implies 
that a person not only has control over what hap­
pens to his body, but also the power to decide 
about the future (use) of his (separated) body ma­
terial. Others argue that Article 11 does not pertain 
to the use of anonymous body material (i.e. the 
donor’s informed consent is not required for the 
use of the material) (Het verworven immuun defi- 
cientiesyndroom, 1989-1990; van Galen-Herman, 
1992).
This disagreement over the applicability range of 
Article 11 has been solved in a new addition to the 
Dutch Civil Code (Book 7, Section 5) which con­
cerns the Medical Treatment Contract {Wet genees- 
kundige behandelingsovereenkomst). According to 
this law, anonymous body material may be used for 
medical research if the patient has not explicitly 
withheld consent for this particular use (Article 
467). The body material referred to in this Article is 
body material that is removed for diagnostic and/or 
therapeutic purposes with the consent of the 
patient. With regard to the use of such body 
material for medical research a policy of 
“no objection” is adequate and valid. The health 
care provider need not inform the patient about 
the possible research uses of his (anonymous) 
body materials. However, the public should be 
informed by the responsible authorities about these 
possible uses of their discarded (anonymous) body 
material.
Article 467 deals only with the use of anonymous 
body material in biomedical research. The legisla­
ture made no provision for research with non-anon- 
ymous, identifiable body material. Since most 
research is carried out with the latter, it has been 
suggested that the use of such material be regulated 
the same way as identifiable personal data, i.e. bio­
medical research will only be allowed if all four cri­
teria mentioned in Article 458 are met (see 
hereunder) (Nationale Raad voor de 
Volksgezondheid, 1991; Doppegieter, 1991; Roscam 
Abbing, 1989).
THE STATUS OF MEDICAL INFORMATION
Information is not usually dealt with in terms of 
ownership, but in terms of privacy. According to 
Gevers, it is difficult to predicate ownership of 
something as “volatile” as personal data. 
Furthermore, ownership of information would 
demand virtually absolute control. Hence, it would 
not be possible to take legitimate interests of third 
parties into account (Gevers, 1988). The fact that 
the concept of ownership is not used with respect to 
information does not mean that an individual has 
no control over personal information. For as we 
have seen, Article 10 of the Dutch Constitution 
explicitly protects the personal domain of life as 
well as personal information.
The Law on the Registration o f Personal Data 
{Wet persoonsregistrade) is an elaboration of para­
graphs 2 and 3 of Article 10 of the Dutch
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Constitution. This law applies to all automated and/ 
or systematized registrations of personal data. A 
registration can only be made for a specified pur­
pose; the data must be obtained legitimately and 
can only be used for the purpose for which they 
have been collected. For registrations of sensitive 
personal data (e.g. medical data) special rules must 
be formulated.
Providing personal data to third parties is only 
possible if this follows from the purpose of the 
registration, is required by law, or is done with 
the consent of the person concerned. For scienti­
fic or statistical research or other important 
reasons, personal data can be provided without 
the consent of the person concerned only if the 
personal domain of life of this person will not 
be disproportionately harmed. Providing personal 
data to third parties is not allowed if the keeper 
has a professional duty of confidentiality 
(secrecy).
The keeper of the registration has to inform the 
person the first time his data are being registered. 
The person has a right to receive, at his own 
request, a full summary of these data and can 
request correction, addition, or removal of infor­
mation. Such a request must be honoured unless it 
conflicts with other interests (e.g. the interests of 
third parties).
The Law on the Medical Treatment Contract 
underscores the patient’s right to correct, add or 
destroy personal data contained in his medical 
chart. A health care provider must destroy infor­
mation about a patient within three months after 
the request from the patient, unless preservation of 
the record is of overriding interest to third parties, 
or destruction is prohibited by law (Article 455), 
No information concerning a patient is to be given 
to third parties without the consent of the patient 
(Article 457).
Providing identifiable personal data without con­
sent of the patient to third parties for scientific or 
statistical research is permitted only if the follow­
ing criteria are met: (1) the request for consent is 
not reasonably feasible; (2) the research serves a 
public interest; (3) the research cannot be con­
ducted without these data; and (4) the personal 
domain of life of the person(s) concerned will not 
be disproportionately harmed (Article 458). Since 
the demand for informed consent could be a hin­
drance to important medical research, no consent 
is required for the use of information that is anon­
ymous (i.e. traceable to the person only with dis­
proportionately great effort or costs), although the 
patient may override this presumed consent by 
objecting explicitly.
THE STATUS OF GENETIC MATERIAL
Having surveyed the opinions and regulations 
regarding body material and medical information,
we now turn to the status of genetic material and 
genetic information. Genetic material is considered 
body material and legally treated as such. However, 
its peculiar nature requires additional regulative 
measures.
Due to recent developments in genetics, the pres­
ervation of cell material in cell banks (DNA banks) 
has become customary. In his proposal for the 
Dutch Society of Health Law, Gevers suggests that 
when cell material is stored for a longer period, 
such storage is sufficiently similar to the registration 
of personal data to warrant a similar regulation. 
Preservation of genetic material requires further 
protection because the privacy of the donor is at 
risk. After all, the very purpose of storage in genetic 
cell banks is to preserve the material for future ap­
plications that may not benefit the donor, yet vio­
late his privacy (e.g. the counselling of third parties 
such as relatives), Gevers worries that the status of 
genetic material stored in cell banks for longer 
periods of time is unclear (although he elsewhere 
suggests that the original donor retains owner­
ship—Gevers, 1990). He recommends that regu­
lations be drafted clarifying the purpose of the cell 
bank, the time period for which the material may 
be kept, and the possible uses of the material. The 
cell bank should transmit this information to the 
person whose material is being kept, so (s)he can 
provide or withhold an informed consent. In ad­
dition, the person should have a right to have his 
or her material made anonymous, or destroyed 
(Gevers, 1987).
In its report on genetics, the Health Council (an 
advisory board of the government) explicitly states 
that under present-day law a person retains owner­
ship of his cell material being stored in a cell bank 
(Gezondheidsraad, 1989). Leenen points out that 
this follows from the nature of “keeping” goods: 
after all, the owner of a storage facility (normally) 
does not own what is stored (Leenen, 1988). 
However, some forms of handing over body ma­
terials may be considered a “donation” with sub­
sequent loss of ownership. Leenen considers the 
giving of blood or sperm to be such donations, but 
he makes no mention of genetic material. The 
Health Council is less willing to assume loss of 
ownership when handing over body material. It 
claims that even when body materials are developed 
into new products, the original “donor” remains 
the owner of these products.
Like Gevers, the Health Council sees a certain 
similarity between the use of cell material and per­
sonal data: the material should only be used for the 
purpose for which it was given. To use the material 
for different purposes requires the informed consent 
of the donor. In an attempt to balance the rights of 
the individual and those of third persons who may 
be benefited by research with those materials, the 
Health Council favours a code of conduct which 
prescribes to record in writing whether a person
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wants to be informed of new information obtained 
from his cell material; whether he or she will allow 
the material to be used for the counselling of rela­
tives; and whether he or she consents to the use of 
this material in scientific research. For the donor to 
provide an informed consent, the keeper of the cell 
bank should provide all necessary information (e.g. 
purpose of the cell bank, feasible research, possible 
future findings). According to the Health Council, 
the donor of the material has the right to withdraw 
his or her consent, and to have the material 
destroyed. As de Wert and de Wachter point out, 
keeping material in a cell bank against the will of 
the person from whom the material was taken con­
flicts with his or her right to control the material 
and is likely to negatively influence the willingness 
of people to store their material in cell banks (de 
Wert and de Wachter, 1990).
Although the person who provides the material is 
the owner of the genetic material, it should not be 
possible for the person to receive financial compen­
sation for the use of his or her material by industry. 
Body parts are not to be viewed as objects of trans­
actions for compensation (Gezondheidsraad, 1989).
In their response to the report of the Health 
Council, the former Secretary for Welfare, Public 
Health and Culture and the Minister of Justice 
agreed with the Health Council that the framework 
of existing legislation should be complemented by a 
code of conduct concerning the storage of cell ma­
terial. Under present-day law, identifiable body ma­
terials can only be used for the purposes for which 
they were stored. The donor’s consent to different 
uses of cell material should be set out in writing 
(Erfelijkheidsdiagnostiek en gentherapie, 1990— 
1991).
On the basis of the proposal by Gevers and the 
report of the Health Council, the Society of 
Health Law has issued its guidelines for genetic 
screening. The Dutch Society stresses the right of 
everyone to decide for themselves whether their 
genetic information and material should be kept 
(stored) after the screening and counselling is com­
pleted. This right is broader than the rights formu­
lated in the Law on the Registration o f Personal 
Data and the Law on the Medical Treatment 
Contract. It implies as well one’s right to have the 
material destroyed. The guidelines also follow the 
Law on the Medical Treatment Contract with 
regard to body materials used for other than speci­
fied purposes. However, greater responsibility is 
placed on the physician (he or she has to inform 
the patient and request consent for the use of ma­
terial for scientific research, etc.) (Richtlijnen 
Vereniging voor Gezondheidsrecht, 1991).
THE STATUS OF GENETIC INFORMATION
With regard to genetic information, the Law on 
the Registration o f Personal Data and the Law on
Medical Treatment Contract continue to apply. 
However, some organizations such as the Health 
Council have suggested that the private nature of 
genetic information requires additional regulation. 
For example, the Council contends that the central 
registration of personal data should be possible 
only after an informed consent is provided, while 
the person always retains the right to have his or 
her data made anonymous, or to have them 
destroyed, even i f  the information is o f importance to 
his relatives. The Council suggests that since formal 
law is less strict, the organizations establishing 
registrations should commit to such stricter guide­
lines. The Health Council believes that the rules 
concerning the use of personal data are also too 
permissive, and recommends that the exceptions for 
this use (Article 458) should be interpreted very 
strictly. According to the Health Council, unrest­
ricted use of anonymous data for health policy is 
not self-evident due to the danger of stigmatization 
of or discrimination against certain population 
groups (Gezondheidsraad, 1989).
The former Secretary for Welfare, Public Health 
and Culture and the Minister of Justice shared 
these concerns of the Health Council but did noi 
consider additional legislation on genetic infor­
mation indicated. For the practical implementation 
of the Law on the Registration o f Personal Data, 
they pointed to the recommendations by the Health 
Council itself, which should secure a restrained use 
of genetic information,
In the various reports and articles mentioned ear­
lier, genetic information is discussed in reference to 
the concept of “privacy” (or personal domain of 
life). The term “ ownership" is hardly ever used. 
Rare examples are found in the writings of ten 
Kate and Kuitert. Due to the conflicts of duty that 
a genetic counsellor faces when a person refuses to 
provide permission to inform his relatives of im­
portant genetic information, ten Kate has suggested 
that genetic information be regarded as “family 
property'*—that is, genetic information is by its 
nature not only information about the individual 
but also about his relatives (ten Kate, 1976), 
According to Kuitert (1989), the medical infor­
mation that a physician acquires about his patient 
is only in the possession of the physician; the patient 
is the true owner of the information. However, 
Kuitert seems to think in ethical rather than legal 
terms— that is, genetic information is confidential 
and has the character of a life secret. Breaking con­
fidentiality would amount to a violation of the 
integrity of the person (Kuitert, 1989).
CONCLUSION
Although the system of Dutch law would allow 
the concept of “ownership” to be applied to body 
material, it is not a concept that figures prominently 
in discussions concerning the status of genetic ma­
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terial. The Health Council and the ethicists de Wert 
and de Wachter (1990) alone contend that a person 
is the “owner” of his or her genetic material. With 
regard to genetic information, “ownership” is sel­
dom mentioned, and then only by geneticists or 
ethicists rather than lawyers. Even in documents 
pertaining to the possibility of the use of genetic m- 
formation by third parties outside the area of health 
care, that is, employers or insurance companies, the 
term is rarely if ever employed. Of importance in 
these discussions, however, is the right of the person 
to protection regarding his personal domain of life 
or “privacy” .
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